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COMMENTS
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF YOUNG CHILDREN-
MINNESOTA ADHERES TO THE MASSACHUSETTS
RULE
[Toetschinger v. Ihnot, __ Minn. -, 250 N.W.2d 204 (1977)].
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether a child of "tender years"' can be held contributorily negli-
gent is a question that has produced disagreement among the courts.2
The majority position, followed in Minnesota, holds that a child of
tender years is capable of contributory negligence,' whereas the minority
position conclusively presumes such a child to be incapable of contribut-
ing to its own injury.' In Toetschinger v. Ihnot5 the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed its view that a child of tender years may be capable of
contributory negligence.6 The decision in Toetschinger, however, did not
1. This terminology is used consistently by the courts in describing young children, but
it has been defined infrequently. The Supreme Court of Washington in Hanson v. Frei-
gang, 55 Wash. 2d 70, 345 P.2d 1109 (1959) gave the following definition: "A child of tender
years is one who, because of insufficient age, knowledge, experience, intelligence, judg-
ment and discretion, is incapable of deliberating and acting upon his own experience and
judgment." Id. at 74, 345 P.2d at 1111.
2. The question of the standard of care applicable to a child defendant who commits a
tort or other wrong against another is beyond the scope of this note. The Minnesota court
has indicated that "minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with age,
experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age .. "Dellwo
v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 862 (1961). The court has also indicated
that a child operating an automobile, boat, or airplane will be held to the standard of an
adult regardless of the child's age. See id. at 458, 107 N.W.2d at 863-64. For a general
discussion of the standard of care applicable to torts committed by children, see Bahr,
Tort Law and the Games Kids Play, 23 S.D. L. RIv. 275 (1978).
3. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser believes
that no minimum age should be set in advance below which a child is to be declared to
he incapable of contributory negligence, but rather that this should be left to a judgment
based on the capacity of the individual child. Id. Not all courts agree with this position.
See, e.g., Walker v. Fresno Distrib. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 840, 847, 44 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73
(1965) (under California law a child under four is incapable of contributory negligence).
4. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 155. This rule has also been imposed by statute.
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.44 (West 1966) (children under the age of seven incapable of
contributory negligence).
5. -. Minn. - , 250 N.W.2d 204 (1977).
6. Id. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 208. Another significant issue raised by the decision in
Toetschinger was the proper application of the emergency doctrine. This issue was pre-
sented because the plaintiff in Toetschinger had run out in front of the defendant's car.
The defendant was aware of the presence of children some 100 feet ahead of her on the
side of the road. The court held that this was a proper case for the application of the
emergency doctrine. See id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 211. The emergency doctrine operates
as follows: "|Ain emergency rule is but a special application of the general standard of
reasonable care and that, when given, it requires a jury to consider the fact of sudden peril
1
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receive the support of the full court. A strong dissent was filed, in which
three justices concurred, advocating the adoption of a conclusive pre-
sumption that a child of tender years cannot be contributorily negligent.
In addition to raising the relative merits of the majority and minority
rules, Toetschinger raises a question as to the manner in which the
majority rule is to be applied under Minnesota law.
In Toetschinger the plaintiff, a five-year-old child, was standing with
his two sisters by the side of a four-lane.through street just beyond an
intersection. The street did not have a crosswalk at this point The
defendant was driving her car on the through street at a speed within
the posted forty-five mile-an-hour limit. Approximately one hundred
feet before the point at which the child was standing, the defendant
realized that children were standing by the side of the road and took her
foot off the accelerator. As the defendant proceeded into the intersec-
tion, the child left his place of safety at the shoulder of the road and
dashed into the path of the car. The defendant applied her brakes but
was unable to avoid striking the child, causing injuries to his mouth and
one of his legs. In an action by the child to collect damages, the defend-
ant asserted that the child was contributorily negligent. The jury re-
turned a verdict finding the child eighty-percent negligent and the de-
fendant twenty-percent negligent. Thus, under Minnesota's compara-
tive negligence statute, the plaintiff's recovery was barred because the
plaintiff was found to be more negligent than the defendant.
7
On appeal, the question of the plaintiff's capacity to be contributorily
negligent was raised. This caused the court to examine its long standing
adherence to the Massachusetts rule,8 which submits the question of
as a circumstance in determining the reasonableness of a person's response thereto."
Urban v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 256 Minn. 1, 4-5, 96 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1959). The court in
Toetschinger distinguished Kachman v. Blosberg, 251 Minn. 224, 232-33, 87 N.W.2d 687,
693-94 (1958) in which the emergency doctrine was held inapplicable to a defendant who
was aware of the presence of children some 300 feet ahead in the road. See Toetschinger
v. Ihnot, - Minn. at-__, 250 N.W.2d at 211. Apparently the court found the difference
of 200 feet, which distinguishes the circumstances of Toetschinger from those of Kachm an,
to be decisive.
7. At the time of the plaintiff's injury Minnesota's comparative negligence statute
barred recovery when the negligence of the plaintiff was as great or greater than that of
the defendant. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976) (current version at Act of Apr. 5, 1978,
ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 839). The statute was amended in 1978 to allow recovery
by a plaintiff whose negligence is equal to or less than that of the defendant. See Act of
Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 839 (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 604.01
(1)).
8. This terminology was first utilized by the Minnesota court in Eckhardt v-. Hanson,
196 Minn. 270, 272, 264 N.W. 776, 777 (1936) to denominate the rule which holds that
the question of the child's contributory negligence is for the jury under proper instructions.
uompare Twist v. Winona & St. P.R.R., 39 Minn. 164, 169, 39 N.W. 402, 405 (1888) and
Decker v. Itasca Paper Co., 111 Minn. 439, 444-45, 127 N.W. 183, 184 (1910) with Eckhardt
v. Hanson, 196 Minn. at 272, 264 N.W. at 777. The Massachusetts rule has been the
longstanding rule in the State of Minnesota. See, e.g., Rosvold v. Johnson, 284 Minn. 162,
[Vol. 5
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whether such a child was contributorily negligent to the jury. In uphold-
ing the application of the Massachusetts rule in Minnesota the majority
found that the rule was grounded in sound considerations of public
policy." In a lengthy dissent, however, a minority of justices urged the
adoption of the Illinois rule,"' which conclusively presumes that a child
under the age of seven years is incapable of contributory negligence.
Because the Massachusetts rule was seriously questioned by four of
the nine justices on the court, the rule's continued application in this
state may be in doubt. Therefore, the Massachusetts and Illinois rules
will be compared, analyzing the policy sought to be served by each rule
and examining whether each rule, in fact, serves that policy. Further,
this Comment examines the application of both rules in an effort to
recommend a future course for the Minnesota court.
II. THE MASSACHUSErrs RULE
The merits of the Massachusetts rule are a function of both its proce-
dural application and its rationale. Two questions must be answered to
resolve the issue of whether a young child was contributorily negligent."
The first is whether the child is capable of negligence; that is, whether
the child has the ability to recognize and cope with the particular danger
which resulted in its injury. Under Minnesota law this question is for
the trial court, not the jury. Once the question of the child's capacity
for contributory negligence is answered, the second question-whether
164, 169 N.W.2d 598, 599 (1969); Audette v. Lindahl, 231 Minn. 239, 242, 42 N.W.2d 717,
719 (1950); Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 264 N.W. 776 (1936).
9. See Toetschinger v. Ihnot, __ Minn. at - , 250 N.W.2d at 210.
10. This terminology was first utilized by the Minnesota court in Eckhardt v. Hanson,
196 Minn. 270, 272, 264 N.W. 776, 777 (1936) to denominate the rule which holds that a
child under the age of seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence. See note 8 supra.
11. No decision in Minnesota clearly sets out the two-step decision-making process. As
a result, a good deal of ambiguity arises as to the exact procedure which must be followed
in Minnesota. The following language, however, makes clear the trial court's role in the
initial determination of the child's capacity for contributory negligence.
The trial judge, who has the opportunity of observing the situation firsthand,
can direct that the child involved, because of tender years, inexperience, or the
subtleties of the danger to be apprehended, cannot be held to be contributorily
negligent under the circumstances of the given case.
Toetschinger v. Ihnot, - Minn. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 210. In a footnote following this
language the court cited several cases to support this power of the trial court. Id. at __ ,
250 N.W.2d at 210 n.2. These cases discuss, generally, the power of the trial court to decide
whether the issue of the child's contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury.
They do not, however, make the procedure by which a child is to be judged contributorily
negligent clearer than does the above quotation from Toetschinger. See Capriotti v. Beck,
264 Minn. 39, 41, 117 N.W.2d 563, 565-66 (1962); Watts v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 264, 267-
68, 69 N.W.2d 626, 629 (1955); Thomsen v. Reibel, 212 Minn. 83, 85, 2 N.W.2d 567, 568
(1942); Decker v. Itasca Paper Co., 111 Minn. 439, 444, 127 N.W. 183, 184 (1910).
19791
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the child acted in a negligent manner-arises.'2 In Minnesota this ques-
tion is for the jury as the trier of fact.'" The standard of care to be applied
by the jury is the care that would be exercised by a "reasonable child
of the same age, intelligence, training and experience"" as the child in
question. Under this standard the jury apparently applies the evidence
introduced on the issue of capacity in its determination of the degree of
care required of the child.
In Watts v. Erickson" the Minnesota court held that because of the
failure to introduce evidence of the particular child's capacity for
contributory negligence, a new trial was required so that the jury could
be "more completely informed as to the experience, training and intel-
ligence of . .. [the child] before . . .[the jury] attempts to pass on
the question of his contributory negligence.""' The court in Watts indi-
cated that evidence sufficient to establish the capacity of the child
would fall into categories of general intelligence, general maturity and
ability, and instructions and warnings from parents or schools as to the
particular mode of conduct in question.'" However, if this evidence is not
sufficient to establish the capacity of the child for contributory negli-
gence when confronted with the particular danger or if the child is too
young, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated in Toetschinger that
the trial court may instruct the jury that the child is incapable of negli-
gence."'
The manner in which the Massachusetts rule is applied in Minnesota
12. Sec Toetschinger v. Ihnot, - Minn. at - , 250 N.W.2d at 210.
13. The Minnesota jury instructions provide: "In the case of a child, reasonable care is
that care which a reasonable child of the same age, intelligence, training and experience
as (name of child) at the time of the (accident) (occurrence) (collision) would have used
under like circumstances." 4 MINNESOTA PRAacIcE JIG I, 104 G-S (2d ed. 1974). This
instruction was quoted with approval in Toetschinger. See - Minn. at - , 250
N.W.2d at 210. Although this instruction states the general standard of care, it does not
clarify the exact procedure by which the court and jury must apply the standard.
14. Rosvold v. Johnson, 284 Minn. 162, 163, 169 N.W.2d 598, 599 (1969) (five-year-old
tricycle rider killed when struck by construction vehicle held contributorily negligent).
15. 244 Minn. 264, 69 N.W.2d 626 (1955).
16. Id. at 269, 69 N.W.2d at 630. Watts involved a child who was hit by a bus while
crossing the street. Noting that the only evidence of the child's capacity was age, the court
stated that "there was no showing of the qualifications of this particular child, such as
experience in crossing the streets, the amount of traffic instructions he had received in
his home, and his general intelligence, knowledge, or experience." Id. at 269, 69 N.W.2d
at 629. For this reason the court granted a new trial so that the jury could be more fully
informed.
17. Id.; accord, Rosvold v. Johnson, 284 Minn. 162, 169 N.W.2d 598 (1969). In Rosvold
the plaintiff appealed on the ground that no evidence of the child's capacity had been
introduced at trial. The court rejected this contention stating that testimony of the child's
father as to the child's obedience, personality, intelligence, maturity, and ability was
sufficient evidence of the child's capacity. Id. at 165, 169 N.W.2d at 599-600. See Van Asch
v. Rutili, 286 Minn. 9, 12, 174 N.W.2d 101, 103 (1970) (evidence of reprimands for failure
to exercise care, familiarity with city streets, and intelligence sufficient).
18. See - Minn. at - , 250 N.W.2d at 210.
JVol. 5
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appears to transform the rule into a rebuttable presumption that a child
under the age of seven years is incapable of contributory negligence.'"
As applied in Watts, the rule shifts the burden of proving the child's
capacity for negligence to the defendant who asserts the contributory
negligence of a young child.2" If the defendant fails to meet this burden,
the trial court is empowered to instruct the jury to find in favor of the
child on the issue of his contributory negligence.2 ' If the defendant intro-
duces evidence sufficient to satisfy the trial court that the child has the
capacity to be contributorily negligent, however, the case goes to the
jury under the special standard of care used for children of tender
years.
2
Although the manner in which the Massachusetts rule is applied in
Minnesota appears to be that of a rebuttable presumption of the child's
incapacity for contributory negligence, the Minnesota court has not
explicitly categorized the rule as creating such a presumption.2 : The
court, however, is aware of and has acknowledged the roles of both the
trial court and the jury in the application of the Massachusetts rule.'
Under the present application of the Massachusetts rule, if the trial
judge does not explicitly rule that the child is incapable of contributory
negligence, the case is submitted to the jury without mention of the
child's capacity for contributory negligence. 25 This procedure is consist-
19. New Jersey case law offers assistance in determining the operation of the Massachu-
setts rule in Minnesota. New Jersey's variation of the Massachusetts rule holds a child of
tender years to be rebuttably presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence. See,
e.g., Dillman v. Mitchell, 13 N.J. 412, 416, 99 A.2d 809, 811 (1953). Under the New Jersey
variation of the Massachusetts rule, if reasonable persons cannot differ as to the child's
incapacity for contributory negligence the trial court may decide the issue. See, e.g., Bush
v. New Jersey & N.Y. Transit Co., 30 N.J. 345, 358, 153 A.2d 28, 33 (1959). If reasonable
persons can differ as to the capacity of the child for contributory negligence, under the
New Jersey approach, the question of the child's capacity for contributory negligence as
well as the question of whether the child acted in a negligent manner in the specific
incident are left to the jury. Id. at 359, 153 A.2d at 35.
20. See Watts v. Erickson, 244 Minn. at 268-69, 69 N.W.2d at 629-30. Under Minnesota
law presumptions cease to operate as soon as evidence which can support a contrary
finding is introduced. See, e.g., Firkus v. Murphy, - Minn. -, -, 246 N.W.2d 864,
866 (1976); cf. Suske v. Straka, 229 Minn. 408, 413, 39 N.W.2d 745, 749 (1949) (once
rebutting evidence is introduced case is decided as if presumption never existed); State
v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 219 Minn. 471, 492, 18 N.W.2d 569, 580 (1945) (absent
rebutting evidence presumption dictates outcome). See also MINN. R. EvID. 301.
21. See, e.g., Toetschinger v. Ihnot, - Minn. 250 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1977).
22. See id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 210.
23. Under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence a rebuttable presumption is not mentioned
to the jury if sufficient evidence has been introduced to rebut it. See MINN. R. EvID. 301.
If the presumption remains unrebutted it dictates the outcome of the issue to which it is
applicable. See id. Thus, the Massachusetts rule appears to operate as a rebuttable
presumption. See id. See generally Thompson, Presumptions and the New Rules of Evi-
dence in Minnesota, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 167, 168-69 (1976).
24. See Toetschinger v. Ihnot, __ Minn. -, -, 250 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1977).
25. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
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ent with the application of a rebuttable presumption under the Min-
nesota Rules of Evidence, which provide that once a presumption is
rebutted, the presumption is not mentioned to the jury. " When the
defendant fails to establish the capacity of the child for contributory
negligence, however, the trial judge may direct that the child is in-
capable of contributory negligence." This result is also consistent with
the Minnesota Rules of Evidence for rebuttable presumptions. "
The failure of the Minnesota court to recognize explicitly the nature
of the Massachusetts rule as a rebuttable presumption of the child's
incapacity for contributory negligence detracts, however, from the cer-
tainty with which the rule is applied. By acknowledging the nature of
the Massachusetts rule as that of a rebuttable presumption, the court
would facilitate a streamlined application of the rule. Explicit recogni-
tion of the rule as a rebuttable presumption also might eliminate the
belief of the dissenting justices in Toetschinger that the results presently
obtained under the Massachusetts rule, as applied in Minnesota, are
uncertain."
The rationale for the Massachusetts rule apparently originated as
dictum in the case of Collins v. South Boston Railroad.:" Holding that
children were to be judged by the standard of whether the child exer-
cised "that degree of care which might reasonably be expected of a child
of his age; or which is ordinarily shown by children of the same age, '"'
the Massachusetts court reasoned:
It would seem that if children unreasonably, intelligently, and inten-
tionally run into danger, they should use the prudence and discretion
which persons of their years ordinarily have, and that they cannot be
permitted with impunity to indulge in conduct which they know, or
ought to know to be careless, because children are often mischievous."
This rationale is quite similar to that given for the Massachusetts rule
by the Minnesota court in Toetschinger,"3 in which the court stated that
young children are permitted by society to assume some degree of re-
sponsibility for their actions and should be held to a degree of care
commensurate with their experience2 The majority in Toetschinger
indicated that this treatment was in line with the common practice of
26. See MINN. R. EvID. 301. See generally Thompson, supra note 23, at 168-69.
27. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
28. See MINN. R. EVID. 301 (presumption imposes the burden of going forward with
evidence on party against whom it operates). See generally Thompson, supra note 23, at
168 (unrebutted presumption necessitates a directed verdict).
29. See Toetschinger v. Ihnot, - Minn. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 220 (Yetka, J.,
dissenting).
30. 142 Mass. 301, 7 N.E. 856 (1886).
31. Id. at 315, 7 N.E. at 860.
32. Id.
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parents of young children who, according to the court, are best able to
assess the capacity of their children." ' The court went on to point out
that more responsibility has been placed on young children since the
rule was first utilized in Minnesota, thus solidifying the basis of the
Massachusetts rule in contemporary considerations of public policy. :"
III. THE ILLINOIS RULE
While the value of the Massachusetts rule lies in its flexible approach,
allowing a determination to be made on the basis of both the specific
fact situation and the individual characteristics of the child, the Illinois
rule has merit in so far as its application dictates the same result in
every case, thus achieving certainty. The rule is quite simple to
apply-all children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed to
be incapable of contributory negligence. The rationale for the Illinois
rule is more troublesome, however, because the rule depends on the
variable of the child's age for its operation. The use of this single varia-
ble gives the Illinois rule the appearance of being arbitrary :7 and possi-
bly unconstitutional.31
The dissenting opinion in Toetschinger, written by Justice Yetka and
joined in by three other members of the court, raised strong objection
to the continued application of the Massachusetts rule in Minnesota."5
Arguing for the adoption of the Illinois rule, the dissent contended that
the Massachusetts rule leaves too much to circumstance and therefore
does not afford young children enough protection."' Relying on the
"common law and the civil law as well as jurisprudence generally," the
dissent contended that the Illinois rule is not arbitrary and that the
collective judgment of many years of analysis represented by the Illinois
rule should be respected."
35. Id. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 210-11.
36. Id. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 210. The public policy considerations mentioned in
support of the Massachusetts rule were first considered by the Minnesota court in Eck-
hardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 274, 264 N.W. 776, 778 (1936).
37. See, e.g., - Minn. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 211 (outcome of litigation should not
be dictated by such a fortuity as age); Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. at 272, 264 N.W.at
777 (Illinois rule referred to as arbitrary).
38. See notes 52-72 infra and accompanying text.
39. - Minn. at - , 250 N.W.2d at 219 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 220 (Yetka, J., dissenting). Before Minnesota had firmly
adopted either the Massachusetts or Illinois rules, the merits of the rules were discussed,
but no decision was reached. See Decker v. Itasca Paper Co., 111 Minn. 439, 444-45, 127
N.W. 183, 184 (1910). In Twist v. Winona & St. P.R.R., 39 Minn. 164, 39 N.W. 402 (1888)
the court also discussed both rules, but came to the conclusion that the authority was all
one way in support of the Massachusetts rule. Id. at 169, 39 N.W. at 405. Finally, in
Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 264 N.W. 776 (1936), the court resolved the apparent
inconsistency between Decker and Twist by adopting the Massachusetts rule. See id. at
272-74, 264 N.W. at 777-78.
41. - Minn. at , 250 N.W.2d at 221-22 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (footnotes omit-
19791
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Refusing to accept the majority's premise that contemporary children
are more advanced in their abilities to perceive and understand danger
than the children around whom the Illinois rule was formulated,'2 the
dissent contended that the rapid technological developments of society
furnish a strong basis for the application of the Illinois rule because the
rule protects children against their inability to comprehend the complex
dangers created by these advances.13 In support of this position, the
dissent discussed psychological literature and findings pointing to the
conclusion that the seven-year cutoff point of the Illinois rule is related
to changes that take place in the physical and mental capacities of
young children. 4 Among the changes contended by the dissent to take
place at the age of seven are "the inception of thought and reason, the
commencement of exchange of ideas, the beginning of concepts of jus-
tice . . . [and the beginning of] social thought and cooperation." 5
The Illinois rule found its origin in the common law presumption that
a child under the age of seven years was incapable of formulating the
necessary mens rea to commit a crime. 6 While this rationale for the
Illinois rule apparently remains unchanged in the Illinois courts, 7 the
Supreme Court of Washington has attempted to develop a more con-
vincing rationale for the application of the rule. In Von Saxe v. Barnett"
the Washington court based its rationale for adherence to the Illinois
rule on the interplay between the public policy decision represented by
the contributory negligence doctrine, which at that time barred recovery
even though the child was only slightly negligent, and the tenderness
with which society regards young children." The court stated that the
contributory negligence doctrine was the result of a public policy deci-
sion against allowing persons partially at fault for their own injury to
42. See id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 222-23 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 223 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at __, 250 N.W.2d at 222-23 (Yetka, J., dissenting). Reliance on psychology
in this area may be unfounded. It has been argued that much of what passes for incapacity
in children is, in reality, a limitation on the development of the child imposed by society.
See Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social
Context, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 38, 75-77 (1975).
45. __ Minn. at - , 250 N.W.2d at 222 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (quoting Tyler v.
Weed, 285 Mich. 460, 473, 280 N.W. 827, 832 (1938) (McAllister, J., dissenting in part)).
46. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 155-56; 20 MINN. L. REv. 685, 686 (1936).
47. Recent Illinois court opinions contain no discussion of the rationale for the rule. See,
e.g., Duffy v. Cortesi, 2 111. 2d 511, 516-17, 119 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1954); Cusick v. Clark,
45 111. App. 3d 763, 766, 360 N.E.2d 160, 163 (1977); Turner v. Seyfert, 44 111. App. 2d 281,
287-88, 194 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1963). Some discussion of the rationale for the rule, however,
is contained in Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 I1. 410, 420-21, 63 N.E. 997, 1001 (1902).
48. 125 Wash. 639, 217 P. 62 (1923), noted in 8 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1923).
49. 125 Wash. at 645-46, 217 P. at 64. The Von Saxe court rendered its decision prior
to the advent of comparative fault systems, therefore even the slightest contributory
negligence on the part of a plaintiff at that time barred recovery. See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 65, at 421.
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thrust that responsibility on another." Then, assuming that children
under the age of seven do not have the capacity for contributory negli-
gence, the Washington court reasoned that because the contributory
negligence doctrine requires people to take responsibility for their own
fault, the doctrine should have no application to a child of tender years
who is not capable of taking responsibility for its own acts.- This ratio-
nale, grounded in considerations of public policy and not in a common
law criminal rule, furnishes some justification for modem application of
the Illinois rule.
The nature of the Illinois rule, of course, is that of an irrebuttable
presumption based on the age of the child.52 Once the basic fact of the
child's age is established, the presumed fact-the incapacity of the child
for contributory negligence-arises. 3 Because of the rule's nature as an
irrebuttable presumption and because the presumption uses age in its
formulation, the rule might present constitutional problems.
One possible basis for an attack on the Illinois rule arises from its use
as an irrebuttable presumption. Such a presumption may be held to
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if the sub-
ject of the presumption is determined to have been denied the oppor-
tunity to establish a basis for his exclusion from the class created by the
presumption.5 4 The rule developed by the United States Supreme Court
to test the constitutionality of an irrebuttable presumption is whether
"it is necessarily or universally true in fact" that the presumed fact
follows the initial fact. 55 If an irrebuttable presumption does not meet
this test, however, the rule it represents is not completely abrogated.
Rather, the individual subject of the presumption must be afforded a
hearing to determine whether he or she is a member of the class created
by the presumption. 56 In effect, the presumption is changed from an
50. 125 Wash. at 645-46, 217 P. at 64.
51. Id.; accord, Ball v. Smith, 87 Wash. 2d 717, 721, 556 P.2d 936, 939 (1976); Cox v.
Hugo, 52 Wash. 2d 815, 819, 329 P.2d 467, 468-70 (1958).
52. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVWDENCE § 342, at 804 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972). An irrebuttable presumption is defined as a substantive rule of law not
related to the fact finding process. See also Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presump-
tions and Burden of Proof, 47 HAav. L. REv. 59, 62 (1933) (no evidence to the contrary
can overthrow a conclusive presumption).
53. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HAv.
L. REv. 1534, 1544-45 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643-48 (1974) (school
board rule requiring pregnant teachers to take leave of absence after fourth month of
pregnancy unconstitutional); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445-54 (1973) (irrebuttable
presumption of nonresidency for state university tuition unconstitutional); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-58 (1972) (irrebuttable presumption that unwed father is incap-
able of caring for children unconstitutional).
55. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974) (quoting Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973)).
56. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (hearing a reasonable alterna-
tive for the state to pursue); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974)
9
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irrebuttable presumption to a rebuttable one. 7
Whether the irrebuttable presumption doctrine would be applicable
to the Illinois rule must be questioned. The class created by the Illinois
rule is made up of all children under seven years of age. Because these
children derive benefit from inclusion in the class, an attack by a mem-
ber of the class on the presumption giving the child such a significant
advantage is nearly impossible to imagine. Further, in cases in which
the Supreme Court has applied the irrebuttable presumption doctrine,
the person challenging the presumption has suffered some harm because
of inclusion in the class created by the presumption." Therefore, to
establish that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine should be applied
to the Illinois rule, a defendant in a negligence action would be required
to claim that the Illinois rule also created a class of defendants who must
defend such actions. But the mere inclusion in such a defendant class
does not result in harm. Thus, while a defendant might argue that the
Illinois rule creates a class of persons required to defend a negligence
action against a child under seven years of age, the possibility of a court
recognizing such a class is remote because under the Illinois rule liability
may not be imposed on a defendant until he is found to be at fault. ' '
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine, therefore, would seem inappli-
cable to the Illinois rule.
Even if a defendant were able to convince a court to apply the irre-
buttable presumption doctrine to the Illinois rule, the rule might well
be declared constitutional. Although the incapacity of a child under the
age of seven for contributory negligence is not "necessarily or universally
true in fact," '' the Supreme Court appears to have modified the irre-
buttable presumption doctrine as it is applied to social welfare legisla-
tion by applying a standard of "reasonableness" to such legislation.'
(reasonable alternative was to require medical certificate stating teacher is able to work).
57. Tribe suggests thai the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is but one of many tests
which may be utilized by the United States Supreme Court to deal with a rule which
seems too harsh, but is not so radical as to be totally unconstitutional. Instead of com-
pletely destroying the rule, the Court simply alters its administration to include an indi-
vidualized hearing. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIT UTIONAL LAW § 16-32 (1978).
58. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (forced leave of
absence in fourth month of pregnancy); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (higher
tuition because of irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (denial of custody of children).
59. See, e.g., Binsfeld v. Curran, 22 Wis. 2d 610, 614, 126 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1964). This
result is mandated by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.44 (West 1966), which establishes a conclu-
sive presumption of incapacity in children under the age of seven.
60. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 452.
61. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975) (irrebuttable presumption in
Social Security Act held valid under reasonableness standard); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1972) (states may draw arbitrary lines to facilitate proof
in worker's compensation and wrongful death statutes). But see Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
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Under the reasonableness standard the courts of a state may conclude
that the irrebuttable presumption of incapacity for contributory negli-
gence of a child under the age of seven is a reasonable rule, especially if
that state has not shifted to a comparative fault analysis.'2 Thus, it is
unlikely that the Illinois rule would be held unconstitutional on this
basis.
Another possible basis for a constitutional attack on the Illinois rule
may be the rule's use of age in its formulation, presenting a possible
violation of the equal protection clause." Recent constitutional attacks
on mandatory retirement programs, however, indicate that the Illinois
rule is unlikely to be held violative of equal protection." These attacks
have failed thus far because the Supreme Court has refused to declare
age a suspect classification." Thus, the Court has applied a "rational
62. In a number of states, the contributory negligence of a plaintiff will bar his recovery.
See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Mosley, 294 Ala. 394, 397, 318 So. 2d 260, 263 (1975);
Smith v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 351 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (La. Ct. App. 1977);
McCay v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 447 Pa. 490, 496, 291 A.2d 759, 762 (1972). In absence
of some sort of protection a young child would presumably be subject to this rule. How-
ever, each of these states employs some sort of presumption to guard young children
against the harsh results of the contributory negligence doctrine. See, e.g., Proctor v.
United States, 443 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (under Alabama law child under
seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence); Smith v.
Waldman, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 166, 169, 164 A.2d 20, 22 (1960) (children under seven
presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence). Compare Garner v. Louisiana Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 860, 862-63 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (six-year-old incapable
of contributory negligence as a matter of law) with White v. Nicosia, 351 So. 2d 234, 237
(La. Ct. App. 1977) (no cutoff point for contributory negligence set in advance) and
Garison v. Wells, 262 So. 2d 820, 823 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (seven-year-old incapable of
contributory negligence).
63. Under the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis, if a classification is declared
to be "suspect," a close relationship must be shown between such a classification and the
end sought to be achieved. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)
(applying strict scrutiny to racial classification). Although a question may arise as to
whether common law rules can violate the equal protection clause, the Court has made it
clear that judicial decisions constitute state action which can be held to violate the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 16 (1948); Watson v.
Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183, 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012 (1974).
64. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-16 (1976)
(per curiam) (mandatory retirement at age 50 for state patrol has a rational basis). How-
ever, it has been argued by at least one commentator that age is an inherently unreason-
able classification. See generally Comment, Mandatory Retirement: Discrimination
Against the Aged Minority, 23 S.D. L. REv. 358, 371 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Larkin, Constitutional Attacks on Mandatory Retirement: A
Reconsideration, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 549, 556 (1976). Larkin indicates that a major flaw
in attacks on mandatory retirement is that much legislation regarding the elderly uses age
as a basis to favor the class. Presumably this argument can be applied by analogy to the
Illinois rule which favors young children. But see Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifica-
tion, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 8,
34-37 (1975) (suggesting that age should be a "semi-suspect" classification). For a more
general discussion of age classifications and their constitutional implications, see L. TRIaE,
supra note 57, at § 16-29 (1978).
11
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basis" standard" rather than the "strict scrutiny" test that is required
when considering suspect classifications. 7 For example, in
Massachusetts Board Of Retirement v. Murgia" the Court upheld a
statute that required state police officers to retire at age fifty, regardless
of physical ability, on the ground that the statute was rationally related
to the state's purpose of assuring that all police officers were physically
fit."" The Court in Murgia reiterated that the rational basis test did not
require legislation to be perfectly tailored to its purpose;6 the fact that
some fifty-year-old police officers were physically fit did not make the
Massachusetts statute irrational.7 Because the Illinois rule apparently
would be judged under the rational basis test,7" the fact that not all
children under the age of seven are incapable of contributory negligence
in every situation probably would be insufficient to support a finding
that the Illinois rule is irrational and thus unconstitutional.
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE MASSACHUSETrS AND ILLINOIS RULES
Both the Massachusetts and Illinois rules have considerable f6llow-
ings among the various courts. Perhaps the ultimate test of each of these
rules should be whether either serves the public policy that created it.
Thus, the advantages and disadvantages of each rule are best analyzed
through an examination of the rationales stated for the rules.
Courts that apply the Massachusetts rule appear to do so on the
premise that even young children are capable of comprehending some
danger and exercising some degree of care."3 To safeguard the viability
of this assumption, these courts have created what amounts to a rebut-
table presumption that the child in question is incapable of contributory
negligence.7 4 A rebuttable presumption of the child's incapacity for neg-
ligence gives the litigant representing the interest of the child a signifi-
cant procedural advantage. 5 A failure to introduce evidence of the
66. See, e.g., Massachussett Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per
curiam).
67. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (applying strict scrutiny test
to racial classification).
68. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 316.
70. Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
71. Id. at 314-17.
72. See id.; Weisbrod v. Lynn, 494 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 940
(1975). Examples of classes which have been declared to be suspect and subjected to the
strict scrutiny test are Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-73 (1971) (alienage) and
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race).
73. See, e.g., Brown v. Connolly, 62 Cal. 2d 391, 395, 398 P.2d 596, 598, 42 Cal. Rptr.
324, 326 (1965); Toetschinger v. Ihnot, - Minn. - , - , 250 N.W.2d 204, 210-11
(1977); Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 274, 264 N.W. 776, 778 (1936); Yun Joeng
Koo v. St. Bernard, - Misc. 2d -, -, 392 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817-18 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Parker v. Hansen, 6 Ohio App. 2d 214, 217, 217 N.E.2d 706, 708-09 (1966).
74. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
75. A rebuttable presumption may shift either the burden of proof or the burden of
[Vol. 5
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child's capacity by the party asserting the contributory negligence of the
child entitles the litigant representing the interests of the child to a
directed verdict on that issue.5 If the trial judge is of the opinion that
the party asserting the contributory negligence of the child has met the
burden of rebutting the presumption of the child's incapacity, however,
the issue of the child's contributory negligence is submitted to the jury
without mention of the presumption." This procedure is reasonable be-
cause the Massachusetts rule, in effect, presumes that the contributory
negligence of the child is unlikely but not impossible.' Thus, the person
asserting the less likely event is required to prove that it was at least
possible." The jury then is allowed to decide the factual issues presented
by the specific occurrence.
In effect, this presumption serves as a threshold question of whether
the child had the capacity to appreciate the specific danger that resulted
in the child's injury." ' In this manner the Massachusetts rule, with its
fundamental assumption that a child of tender years is capable of exer-
cising some degree of care, can be administered without fear that a child
who is unable to comprehend a danger causing its injury will be declared
contributorily negligent.'"
As judge-made law the Massachusetts rule is an excellent method for
weighing the facts necessary for a finding that a young child is contribu-
torily negligent. First, the rule is justifiable in light of changes in society
that have resulted in placing increased responsibility on young chil-
dren."' Second, the application of a multi-variable test-age, intelli-
gence, training, and experience-helps to ensure that the rule is applied
with fairness.'" Finally, the Massachusetts rule is able to bridge the
persuasion to the party not normally required to come forward with evidence on that issue.
See generally Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUM.
L. REv. 527, 528-29 (1955).
76. See, e.g., Toetschinger v. Ihnot - Minn. 250 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1977);
Watts v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 264, 268-69, 69 N.W.2d 626, 629 (1955) (before issue of
child's contributory negligence goes to jury sufficient evidence of capacity must be intro-
duced); Note, supra note 75, at 529 (failure to introduce rebutting evidence requires
directed verdict for party in whose favor the presumption operates).
77. See, e.g., Toetschinger v. Ihnot, - Minn. 250 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1977).
See also MINN. R. EvID. 301.
78. See generally Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. Ray. 324,
329 (1952) (reason for creation of presumption is to promote decisions in accord with
probabilities); Morgan, supra note 52, at 930 (party against whom presumption operates
is relying on the unusual and is required to prove it).
79. See generally Morgan, supra note 52, at 930.
80. See generally Keet, Contributory Negligence of. Children, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv.
395, 401-03 (1963).
81. See id.; cf. Stumbo, Presumptions-A View at Chaos, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 182, 183
(1964) (principal reason for creation of presumptions is implementation of social policy).
82. See Toetschinger v. Ihnot, - Minn. -, -, 250 N.W.2d 204, 210-11 (1977).
83. See notes 14, 17-18 supra and accompanying text. The utilization of these factors
in assessing the capacity of a child for contributory negligence helps to insure that a child
13
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obvious gap between the harsh results sometimes achieved under con-
tributory negligence rules and the tenderness with which society treats
young children.
While the Massachusetts rule views children under the age of seven
as capable of exercising some care for their own safety, the basic premise
of the Illinois rule appears to rest on the conviction that a child of tender
years is "immature" ' and thus incapable of exercising care for its own
safety. This premise appears to be equally applicable whether the courts
choose to view the Illinois rule as derived from the common law crimi-
nal rule or as a public policy exception to the doctrine of contributory
negligence.85
Further, because of its nature as a conclusive presumption, the Illinois
rule appears arbitrary. That all children under the age of seven are
incapable of perceiving and understanding every danger that causes
them harm cannot be contended seriously. Further, as a conclusive
presumption, the Illinois rule constitutes a substantive rule of law", and
thus is inflexible."' As a result of this inflexibility, the rule is incapable
of adjusting to changes in the manner society treats young children who
are increasingly exposed to sophisticated ideas at an early age. While
the dangers created by society may become more complex and incom-
prehensible,88 many common dangers will not change, whereas the abil-
ity of young children to understand these dangers, such as crossing the
street, is likely to increase as information and education are received at
an earlier age. Because the Illinois rule does not provide for recognition
of these changes, the rule may serve to impede rather than facilitate
social progress.8 9
who is incapable of negligence in a particular situation will not be found contributorily
negligent. Thus, the multi-variable test facilitates a fair application of the Massachusetts
rule.
84. See, e.g., Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 420-21, 63 N.E. 997, 1001 (1902).
The court in Tuohy stated:
Up to a certain age, the precise limit of which is not and perhaps cannot be well
defined, a child is incapable of such conduct as will constitute contributory
negligence. . . . The rule thus contended for is sometimes said to be analogous
to the rule of common law which exempts children under seven years of age from
criminal responsibility.
Id. The court then proceeded to declare a child of six incapable of contributory negligence.
85. Compare Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 422, 63 N.E. 997, 1001 (1902) with
Von Saxe v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 645-46, 217 P. 62, 64 (1923).
86. See, e.g., E. MORGAN, BASic PROBiEMS OF EVDENCE 31 (1962); Stumbo, supra note
81, at 188.
87. See Stumbo, supra note 81, at 188 (procedural effect of a conclusive presumption
is always the same).
88. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
89. See generally O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 126 (1881) ("precedents should be
overruled when they become inconsistent with present conditions").
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Although the Illinois rule has merit when the alternative is to hold
that a slight degree of negligence on the part of a young child is a
complete bar to recovery, the rule's appeal is diminished considerably
when its application in a state that compares the fault of the victim with
that of the defendant is considered. In a state that has a comparative
fault system, as does Minnesota,9" a conclusive presumption of a young
child's incapacity for negligence seems to defeat the whole purpose of
comparative fault-apportionment of liability for injury.' An applica-
tion of the Illinois rule in Minnesota would abrogate comparative fault
for all plaintiffs under the age of seven because if such children cannot
be held negligent as a matter of law there is no fault to compare with
the fault of the defendant. Assuming that some fault on the part of the
defendant could be proved, the child would be entitled to a full recovery
even though the injury was caused in part by acts or omissions of the
child. This result is not in accord with the comparative fault system
adopted by the Minnesota Legislature."2
Thus, the Massachusetts rule, which holds that a child capable of
90. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6,
1978 Minn. Laws 839. That section reads in part as follows:
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for fault resulting in death or injury to
person or property, if the contributory fault was not greater than the fault of
the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person
recovering.
Id.
91. Cf. Thomas v. Tesch, 268 Wis. 338, 67 N.W.2d 367 (1955) (because child of five is
incapable of contributory negligence, submission of contributory negligence question to
jury was error). Because what is really compared under the comparative fault act is the
contribution made to the accident by each party's negligence, see Winge v. Minnesota
Transfer Ry., 294 Minn. 399, 403, 201 N.W.2d 259, 263 (1972), the policy behind the
statute would be defeated.
92. Cf. Price v. Amdal, - Minn .... 256 N.W.2d 461, 464 (1977) (purpose
behind statutory presumption of decedent's due care reexamined in light of comparative
negligence statute), noted in 4 WM. MrrCHE.L L. Rav. 245 (1978). However, a contrary
argument is possible. Becaue Minnesota's comparative fault statute was originally
adapted from Wisconsin's statute, Olson v. Hartwig, 288 Minn. 375, 377, 180 N.W.2d 870,
872 (1970); Note, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk-The Case for Their
Merger, 56 MINN. L. REv. 47, 65 (1971); see Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 242, § 1, 1931 Wis.
Laws 375, as amended by Act of July 26, 1949, ch. 548, § 2, 1949 Wis. Laws 498, as
amended by Act of May 20, 1965, ch. 66, § 4, 1965 Wis. Laws 95 (current version at Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)), and because Wisconsin also has a statute
that implements a conclusive presumption of incapacity for negligence of a child under
seven, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.44 (West 1966), an argument can be made that Minne-
sota's comparative fault law and the Illinois rule are not really in conflict. The other side
of the argument is that the Minnesota Legislature was aware of Wisconsin's conclusive
presumption but did not adopt it. Therefore, the Minnesota court should not adopt the
Illinois rule by judicial decision but should defer to the Legislature.
15
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understanding the particular danger with which he is confronted may
be contributorily negligent, clearly is more in line with Minnesota policy
than is the Illinois rule, which sets an arbitrary age below which a child
is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence.
The application of the Massachusetts rule in Minnesota would be im-
proved, however, by the court's explicit recognition of the rule as a
rebuttable presumption. The suggestion that the Minnesota court im-
plement the Massachusetts rule as a rebuttable presumption is aimed
simply at a clarification of the application of the rule and at the creation
of a compromise position to reunify the court behind the Massachusetts
rule. Because the principal criticism leveled against the Massachusetts
rule by the dissent in Toetschinger was that the rule does not afford
young children enough protection, the institution of an explicit rebut-
table presumption of the child's incapacity for contributory negligence
would afford a stronger safeguard. A rebuttable presumption of the
child's incapacity for contributory negligence would make it clear that
the burden is on the defendant to prove the child's capacity for negli-
gence in the particular situation in question. Regardless of whether the
Minnesota court explicitly recognizes the Massachusetts rule as a re-
buttable presumption, however, application of the rule will continue to




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss1/4
